In any period, reliable and up-to-date sources of accurate information are vital to the function of a government, and, inevitably, the possession of superior intelligence provides an important strategic advantage. This factor was no less important during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. With reference to the issue of communications, this essay seeks to explain how the Spanish (or Castilian) crown during this time managed its worldwide empire. It emphasizes the contribution of, and the tension between, the crown’s two main strategies, namely, political decentralization (or delegation) and imperial centralization. Drawing on the comments of both contemporary observers and modern historians, this paper examines the approaches used by the Spanish kings in ensuring the optimum reliability of their intelligence networks within Europe and with America. Ultimately, these monarchs utilized centralized authority and decentralized administration in a complementary fashion to ensure that their provinces around the world were governed efficiently.
For the Spanish monarchs and their governments during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the problem of distance was inextricably linked to that of reliable communications. In his book, Command in War, Creveld contends that “war consists…of an endless quest for certainty” and that two factors generate certainty—one of which is “the amount of information available” and the other of which is the “nature” of the undertaking at hand.[1] For the Habsburg rulers of Spain in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, this search for certainty was no less important.[2] In 1559, Venetian Ambassador Michele Suriano wrote that, in governance, “nothing is more helpful and necessary than accurate information.”[3] Early modern governments used various methods of communications; however, nothing could replace having the monarch present to rule a jurisdiction in person. To quote Guilmartin, “a competent and responsible commander on the scene” cannot be replaced by any “amount of communications.”[4] Lovett notes that the presence of the monarch in one of his districts—allowing him to communicate directly with his subjects—was inevitably the most effective and popular form of government during this period.[5] Nonetheless, this method was seldom realistic—even during the more “migratory” reign of Charles V (1519-1556)—so the Spanish kings resorted to other means.[6]
More significant than the speed of the communications was the level of consistency involved.[7] The delivery of information during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was notoriously unreliable. Within Europe, a regular postal service operated, but the journey between Brussels and Madrid typically took around two weeks.[8] Philip II (1556–1598) himself blamed many of his governmental issues on the “distance” between his many kingdoms – and, thus, the unpredictability of the correspondence between them.[9] In one case, Philip sent a dispatch ordering his commanders in the Netherlands to seek a military settlement with the Dutch rebels. Unfortunately for him, the courier was delayed, and, by the time the dispatch arrived, the commands were no longer relevant to the situation.[10] More significant for the Spanish monarchs, was the problem of governing their American colonies.[11] Lovett sees the issues associated with distance and governance as “magnified” in relation to the administration of the Indies.[12] In fact, a special committee tasked with examining American colonial issues counted the lack of information—a direct result of the Indies” distance from Spain—as among the main causes of maladministration on the continent.[13] The rarity of reliable, consistent, and up-to-date information caused an added level of complexity in the governing of the Spanish empire in Europe and abroad.
Spanish kings used many strategies to minimize the unreliability and inconsistency of communications during their reign. This factor was more important for Philip II as he spent very little time outside of Spain and, consequently, needed a reliable means of information gathering. Across the empire, Philip II created a massive web of communications to ensure the reliability and consistency, if not the speed, of the intelligence he received. Already in place was a bi-monthly postal service between Madrid and Brussels; similar services also ran from Madrid to Rome and Vienna respectively.[14] When necessary, special messengers could be sent with particularly important messages.[15] Parker points out the numerous other tactics that the Spanish kings used to improve the reliability of their courier services. Typically, they would send more than one messenger with critical dispatches to ensure they reached their destination; however, they would also often send multiple copies along with historical messages for reference.[16] The monarchs also commonly sent vital dispatches along multiple delivery routes and ordered that copies be forwarded on to further destinations.[17] In this way, they could ensure that their recipient had the greatest chance of obtaining accurate orders or correspondence.
Philip also expected his ministers, viceroys, and commanders to supply him with consistent updates and to correspond regularly with their colleagues.[18] Ambassador Suriano noted that kings and governments used “various channels” to gain reliable and consistent information.[19] He then added, somewhat opportunistically perhaps, that no such channel of information was “better than ambassadors.”[20] Philip II, in particular, utilized both couriers and resident ambassadors to great effect.[21] Parker observes that, under Philip, Spain had the “largest diplomatic establishment of any state” and Philip demanded that he be consistently informed by all of his ambassadors.[22] Ambassador Lippoman of Venetia noticed the significant quantity of correspondence from ambassadors and deputies that Philip II had to personally deal with, stating that he “…is never idle, for [he] wish[es] to read for himself all the correspondence which passes between his ambassadors and governors in all parts of his great domains.”[23] Using numerous simple means, Philip II and the other kings of Spain were able to greatly increase the consistency and reliability of the intelligence available to them.
Other factors also supplemented the information network of couriers and ambassadors. Firstly, the crown was kept well-informed—sometimes voluntarily, and sometimes otherwise – by the efficient private communications networks, such as those run by merchants.[24] Parker notes that these private systems often operated more efficiently than even the public intelligence network.[25] Further, Philip II made a concerted effort to gain as much information about his empire as he could, allowing him to make more educated policy decisions for lands he may never have visited.[26] The ways he did this varied dramatically. Haring points out that he tried to learn from the experience of former governors.[27] Philip also commissioned special juntas to manage the affairs of foreign imperial jurisdictions and investigate the best decisions for their administration.[28] Kamen argues that without this information, it would not have been possible to run the vast Spanish empire.[29] These factors effectively enhanced the royal communications system.
Inevitably, the problem of communications with the Americas—and, consequently, the tactics used to solve it—was similar to that in the rest of the Spanish empire, although amplified greatly. A typical journey to or from the New World took anywhere from four to nine months.[30] Government correspondence followed the pattern of the annual trade voyages; however, the Spanish crown did its best to ensure the reliability—if not the speed – of those convoys.[31] The need to secure these sea routes and ensure adequate training for pilots was generally recognized at the time.[32] For urgent news, special “advice ships” could be employed to make the trip at any time.[33] Lovett could accurately say, then, that a “steady stream” of information and news flowed from Mexico and Peru to the Old World.[34] Hence, by the time of Philip II, the Spanish monarchs had access to better and more up-to-date intelligence than their European rivals.[35] In one instance, well before his own government informed him of it, the French Ambassador received news from Philip of his government’s victory over the protestant forces.[36] Therefore, while speed would always remain an issue, the Spanish kings found many ways to improve the secure flow of reliable information from the Americas as well as within Europe.
The kings of Spain typically ruled by delegation, whatever form it may have taken, rather than by replacing the institutions of the kingdoms they ruled or governing them from Spain.[37] This need was inevitable, as day-to-day government from a distance was impossible; however, the degrees of delegation and the methods used varied. For example, Philip II tended to be less involved in running separate jurisdictions within his empire and more focused on the empire itself.[38] Hence, he relied more on loyal, capable viceroys to administrate for him.[39] In contrast, Philip’s father, Charles V, was known to exercise his power more in person, traveling his empire to maintain his authority.[40] Nevertheless, both monarchs necessarily delegated—differing only in technique and degree. For Charles, the regency of states within the empire was more customarily given to Habsburg relatives. For instance, Marguerite of Austria, Mary of Hungary, and Margaret of Parma, in turn, were made regents of the Netherlands, while Charles’s younger brother, Ferdinand, was given Austria and the Holy Roman Empire.[41] Philip, on the other hand, tended to give regency over provinces within the empire to loyal Spanish (or, more correctly, Castilian) nobles.[42]
Even in Philip’s time, however, it was sometimes prudent to have a royal presence in more important—or unstable—parts of the empire. Consequently, in the reigns of both Charles V and Philip II, jurisdictions like Portugal and the Netherlands typically demanded a member of the royal family to be their regent.[43] Rodríguez-Salgado has outlined several of the functions expected of the king’s representative. These included the need to represent the king and to execute his commands as well as to provide for the more general needs of the district by ensuring defense and effective government.[44] Regents could be quite independent; in fact, Rodríguez-Salgado notes many conflicts over finance and other issues between the sovereign and their regents.[45] Nevertheless, while a significant level of delegation was a necessary element of the Spanish government during this period, it was certainly more effective to have the monarch dwelling in person in any particular province.[46]
All realms of the empire, whether in the Iberian peninsula or abroad, had some form of delegated administration. Within Spain, the kingdoms of Aragon and Navarre were run as viceroyalties—a model for the American colonial governments—and Catalonia was administrated by a governor or, in times of war, a captain-general.[47] In wider Europe, jurisdictions like Portugal and the Netherlands were also ruled by regents, and the Italian states, while accepting the sovereignty of the king and under the authority of a viceroy, maintained their own laws, customs, and localized governments.[48] Overseas, the government of the Spanish colony of Manila, although under the authority of the viceroyalty of New Spain, was managed relatively independently.[49] Likewise, the Spanish crown almost totally delegated the management of the Portuguese empire.[50] The kings of Spain used many different forms of delegated government in their realms.
The delegated Spanish government of the Americas took two forms: centralized, peninsula-based administration and decentralized, colonial government. The situation in America is broadly representative of the style of the imperial Spanish administration, although, due to its distance from Spain, it is the most extreme example. Firstly, Spanish kings gave much responsibility for the administration and logistical questions of the Indies to a special council, based in Spain, called the Royal and Supreme Council of the Indies.[51] Williams calls councils like this the “central apparatus of the state.”[52] In the earliest days of the colony, the Spanish government had established the House of Trade, a regulatory body, based in Seville, tasked with protecting the Spanish monopoly on trade with America, regulating traffic, monitoring the colonies, and other similar responsibilities.[53] As the colonies grew, however, another administrative body was deemed necessary, and in 1524 Philip II established the Council of the Indies.[54] The Council of Aragon, established thirty years earlier, was used as a model for the Council of the Indies and many subsequent councils, including the councils of Italy (c. 1559), Portugal (1582), and Flanders (1588).[55] Similar to other imperial councils, the Council of the Indies’ influence was over all political aspects of the Americas and all colonial government officials were appointed by and responsible to it.[56] It formed, in Lovett”s words, a “basic structure of government” and acted as a supreme court (as Haring states, a “court of last resort”) for the colonies.[57] The Council of the Indies was not, however, the king’s only peninsula-based form of government. Juntas, and other types of informal and formal investigations, became popular ways to delegate investigative work regarding particular colonial issues.[58] These became a common mode of receiving independent policy recommendations.[59] One junta even recommended that to reduce costs and increase efficiency, the Council of the Indies be moved to the colony itself.[60] Thus, not all delegated authority for the Indies was based in the colonies. The House of Trade, and later the Council of the Indies, acted as an advisory and logistical body to oversee the colonies from within Spain.
Delegated administration also came in its overseas form with viceroys, governors, and captains-general sharing power with audiencias on the American continent.[61] From early in the colony’s history, the Spanish monarchs recognized the need to have administrative institutions based in America. Hence, the first audiencia was established and the first viceroy appointed.[62] Due to America’s distance from Spain, viceroys were invariably given what historians have variously called a “voluminous” and “elaborate” set of instructions from the Council of the Indies by which they were to run the colony.[63] The Castilian possessions in America were divided into the two viceroyalties of Peru and New Spain, controlled by two viceroys who also served as the governor of their district of residence.[64] Each viceroyalty was further divided into multiple jurisdictions, known as presidencies or captaincy-generals depending on their particular style of government.[65] Generally, the president of the region’s audiencia was also appointed the governor of that area.[66] The power of the viceroys was, to quote Haring, “comprehensive,” although the sovereigns understandably appreciated “regular correspondence.”[67] Of course, to be able to handle the mammoth task of governing either Peru or New Spain, they needed to be capable administrators.[68] The audiencias of the New World, unlike those in the Old, had legislative and administrative powers as well as judicial authority.[69] They shared power with the viceroys and played an important role in the “routine administration” of the colonies.[70] These two institutions—the viceregal system and the audiencia – worked, for the most part, as an effective localized delegation of the everyday administration of the American colonies. In this way, through executive delegation to local authorities and bureaucratic councils, Philip II, Charles V, and the other Spanish monarchs could manage the administration of their global empire without fast means of communication.
To ensure that delegation did not divide their empire, the Spanish kings needed to maintain the central importance of royal authority. For both Charles V and Philip II, royal authority and, thus, the empire’s unity, was tied to the character of the sovereign, but this was more obviously the case for Charles as Philip later began a program of reform—transforming the empire from an entirely Habsburg-centric realm to an increasingly Spanish one.[71] He did this in two main ways. Firstly, Philip increasingly promoted trusted Castilians, rather than his Habsburg relatives, to positions of power.[72] In this way, he subverted the danger of rival family members bringing disunity to his empire. Ambassador Suriano noted this development in Italy, stating that “the benefits and honors of the kingdom…are generally given to the Spaniards….”[73] Secondly, Philip also centered the empire in Spain, making Madrid his capital in 1561.[74] Williams argues that Philip sought to make Spain, or perhaps, more correctly, Castile, “the heart of his empire.”[75] From this basis, Philip set out to ensure that absolute, unchallenged imperial authority was sustained throughout his empire.[76] He ensured that the central government—and, ultimately, himself—was solely responsible for policy-making.[77] As his father had done, he favored a small, centralized bureaucracy for this purpose.[78] The king also prioritized a reestablishment in many of his jurisdictions of the ultimate supremacy of the crown over all matters.[79]
To conclude, there was no single strategy for solving the administrative problems presented by a lack of fast communications methods. Rather, the Castilian crown used various strategies to sure up their intelligence arrangements and to adequately govern their jurisdictions throughout the world. This essay has outlined some of the approaches pursued by the Spanish monarchs in this regard. It briefly touched on the myriad of techniques used to improve the reliability, although not primarily the speed, of their communications networks. This provided them with the ability to receive a stable flow of information to assist in governing their realms. In fact, the Spanish monarchs succeeded in this effort to the point that their information was often more reliable, and sometimes even more readily available, than that of their rivals. The paper also examined the two vital factors of centralized authority and delegated government, which worked in concert to allow for relative coherence and efficiency throughout the Spanish lands without the need for direct, centralized administrative control. Employing the American colonies as a case study, this essay explored the use of viceroys, audiencias, councils, and other executive institutions. The vast bulk of the most comprehensive and detailed literature (both primary and secondary) on the topic of this work relates to the reigns of the Catholic monarchs, Charles V and Philip II. Therefore, this essay has emphasized the situation during the reigns of these two monarchs. Nevertheless, a complete study of the subtle variations of policy between these and the succeeding monarchs is beyond the scope of this paper. It does, however, contribute a general overview of the subject at hand. In this way, the Spanish kings of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries could overcome, or accommodate, to some degree, the issue of communications in their empire.
Endnotes:
Martin van Creveld, Command in War (Massachusetts and London: Harvard University Press, 1985), 164-165.
Henry Kamen, Spain’s Road to Empire: The Making of a World Power (London: Penguin, 2003), 158.
Michele Suriano, “The strongest and safest Christian land”, in Pursuit of Power, ed. James C. Davis (New York, Evanston and London: Harper & Row Publishers, 1970), 35.
Quoted in Geoffrey Parker, The Grand Strategy of Philip II (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1998), 74.
A.W. Lovett, Early Habsburg Spain, 1517-1598 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 123-124.
Lovett, Early Habsburg Spain, 126.
Parker, The Grand Strategy, 52-55.
Kamen, Spain’s Road to Empire, 158.
Quoted in Parker, The Grand Strategy, 48.
A.W. Lovett, Philip II and Mateo Vázquez de Leca: The Government of Spain (1572-1592) (Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1977), 140-141.
C.H. Haring, The Spanish Empire in America (New York: Harbinger Books, 1963), 76.
Lovett, Philip II and Mateo, 148.
Cited in Lovett, Philip II and Mateo, 22.
Parker, The Grand Strategy, 48.
Parker, The Grand Strategy, 49; M.J. Rodríguez-Salgado, The Changing Face of Empire: Charles V, Philip II and Habsburg Authority, 1551-1559 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 93.
Parker, The Grand Strategy, 55.
Parker, The Grand Strategy, 55.
Parker, The Grand Strategy, 56.
Suriano, “The strongest and safest,” 36.
Suriano, “The strongest and safest,” 36.
Parker, The Grand Strategy, 47.
Parker, The Grand Strategy, 56.
Paolo Tiepolo, Giovanni Soranzo and Girolamo Lippomano, “Philip II: “phlegmatic,” “assiduous,” “kindly and natural””, in Pursuit of Power, ed. James C. Davis (New York, Evanston and London: Harper & Row, 1970), 86.
Parker, The Grand Strategy, 57-58.
Parker, The Grand Strategy, 55.
Haring, The Spanish Empire, 96; Kamen, Spain’s Road to Empire, 160-161; Parker, The Grand Strategy, 59-63; Patrick Williams, Philip II (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), 46.
Haring, The Spanish Empire, 12-13.
Lovett, Philip II and Mateo, 22 and 52-53.
Kamen, Spain’s Road to Empire, 256.
Parker, The Grand Strategy, 50.
David C. Goodman, Power and Penury: Government, Technology and Science in Philip II”s Spain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 89; Parker, The Grand Strategy, 50.
P.E.H. Hair (ed.), To Defend Your Empire and the Faith (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1990), 30-31, 166-167, 170-171 and 204.
Parker, The Grand Strategy, 50.
Lovett, Philip II and Mateo, 148.
Parker, The Grand Strategy, 49.
Parker, The Grand Strategy, 49.
Haring, The Spanish Empire, 3-4; H.G. Koenigsberger, The Practice of Empire (New York: Cornell University Press, 1969), 82-83.
Kamen, Spain’s Road to Empire, 161-162.
Koenigsberger, Practice of Empire, 95-96; Williams, Philip II, 8-9.
Williams, Philip II, 8-9.
Lovett, Early Habsburg Spain, 40 and 55; William H. Prescott, History of the Reign of Philip the Second, King of Spain, New Rev. Ed. (London: George Routledge, 1887), 153-154.
Haring, The Spanish Empire, 647; Koenigsberger, Practice of Empire, 87.
Jean Bérenger, A History of the Habsburg Empire, 1273-1700 (London and New York: Longman, 1994), 219-220; Lovett, Early Habsburg Spain, 146 and 176.
Rodríguez-Salgado, Changing Face of Empire, 20-21.
Rodríguez-Salgado, Changing Face of Empire, 22-23, 212, 278-296.
Rodríguez-Salgado, Changing Face of Empire, 23.
Lovett, Philip II and Mateo, 141; Lovett, Early Habsburg Spain, 214; Williams, Philip II, 92.
Kamen, Spain’s Road to Empire, 174; Koenigsberger, Practice of Empire, 83, 95-96 and 105-106; Lovett, Early Habsburg Spain, 146 and 176.
Kamen, Spain’s Road to Empire, 202-203.
Hair, To Defend Your Empire, 2; Lovett, Early Habsburg Spain, 176-177.
M.N. Pearson, “Merchants and states,” in The Political Economy of Merchant Empires, ed. James D. Tracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 81; Prescott, History of the Reign, 647; J. Vicens Vives, “The administrative structure of the State in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries”, in Government in Reformation Europe, 1520-1560, ed. Henry J. Cohn (London and Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1971), 75; Williams, Philip II, 67.
Williams, Philip II, 67.
Kamen, Spain’s Road to Empire, 288-289; Lovett, Early Habsburg Spain, 83; Williams, Philip II, 86-87.
J.H. Elliot, Imperial Spain, 1469-1716 (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1963), 171-172; Haring, The Spanish Empire, 94-95; J.H. Parry, The Audiencia of New Galicia in the Sixteenth Century: A Study of Spanish Colonial Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1948), 4.
Koenigsberger, Practice of Empire, 60; Lovett, Early Habsburg Spain, 122.
Haring, The Spanish Empire, 97-98; Koenigsberger, Practice of Empire, 61-62.
Elliot, Imperial Spain, 171-172;Haring, The Spanish Empire, 98; Lovett, Early Habsburg Spain, 84.
Koenigsberger, Practice of Empire, 64-65; Lovett, Philip II and Mateo, 22.
Williams, Philip II, 87-88.
Lovett, Philip II and Mateo, 22.
Haring, The Spanish Empire, 70.
Haring, The Spanish Empire, 72.
Goodman, Power and Penury, 174; Haring, The Spanish Empire, 73; Kamen, Spain’s Road to Empire, 193.
Haring, The Spanish Empire, 71.
Haring, The Spanish Empire, 71.
Parry, Audiencia of New Galicia, 131-132.
Haring, The Spanish Empire, 11 and 110-112.
Williams, Philip II, 927.
Haring, The Spanish Empire, 15 and 77; Lovett, Philip II and Mateo, 22 and 144-145; Parry, Audiencia of New Galicia, 5-6.
Elliot, Imperial Spain, 171-172;Lovett, Philip II and Mateo, 71 and 112.
Rodríguez-Salgado, Changing Face of Empire, 20-21 and 221; Williams, Philip II, 8.
Kamen, Spain’s Road to Empire, 161; Lovett, Early Habsburg Spain, 126-127 and 192-195; Prescott, History of the Reign,646; Williams, Philip II, 33.
Suriano, “The strongest and safest,” 47.
Kamen, Spain’s Road to Empire, 161; Lovett, Early Habsburg Spain, 125-126, 128 and 155-156; Williams, Philip II, 54-55.
Williams, Philip II, 46.
Haring, The Spanish Empire, 69; Kamen, Spain’s Road to Empire, 192-193.
Haring, The Spanish Empire, 3; Kamen, Spain’s Road to Empire, xxiv and 161-162; Williams, Philip II, 64.
Lovett, Early Habsburg Spain, 122-123; Parry, Audiencia of New Galicia, 133.
Kamen, Spain’s Road to Empire, 195 and 255; Lovett, Early Habsburg Spain, 147; Rodríguez-Salgado, Changing Face of Empire, 22; Williams, Philip II, 86-87, 167 and 236.
Originally published as Mitchell, Cody Bryan. “Problems of Distance, Communications, and Authority: How Charles V and Philip II Ruled the Global Spanish Empire.” Armstrong Undergraduate Journal of History 12, no. 3 (Nov. 2022).
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